This paper discusses the literature on strategic use of debt models and tests the seminal models of Persson & Svensson (1989) and Alesina & Tabellini (1990) on a dataset of Flemish municipalities. The literature on strategic deficit and debt behaviour originates from the question whether or not incumbent policymakers run higher budget deficits than they would if they were confident of re-election. In this paper, we introduce a vote function to estimate the probability of electoral defeat and present evidence of strategic debt in line with Persson & Svensson (1989) , but only for leftist governments with expected vote percentages below 49%. There is no indication that rightist governments without re-election prospects are sensitive to strategic debt behaviour.
Introduction
Traditionally tax-smoothing theory suggests that deficits and surpluses are used to minimise the distorting effects of taxation (Barro, 1979) . However, political economy models not only relate deficits and debt to the business cycle but they also highlight the role played by the timing of elections in framing fiscal policy. This literature suggests that governments change fiscal policy to attract more votes as well as to increase their chances of being re-elected. 1 However, a potential change in fiscal policy is not exclusively characteristic of governments which believe that they have a good chance of staying in office. An interesting finding is that governments expecting to be voted out might also modify fiscal policy. The time-inconsistency theory of politics (see Kydland & Prescott, 1977; Fischer, 1980) predicts that judgements regarding the likelihood of a regime change drive policy changes. A government expecting to be voted out of office may opt to follow a second-best policy if this allows it to control the fiscal environment of the future government. For example, the creation of debt by an outgoing government places a constraint on the new government which will have no choice but to accept it, even if it means having to sacrifice parts of its own spending programme. This situation is described in the literature covering strategic deficit and debt behaviour.
In this paper, we investigate empirically whether strategic debt behaviour is present in Flemish municipalities. A crucial element in empirical tests on strategic debt behaviour involves finding a good proxy for the government's expectation of a regime change. For this purpose, most previous empirical analyses on strategic debt models have used historical political stability information. Still, none of the approaches are equal. The novelty of this paper is that we use a vote function to measure the expectation of the probability of electoral defeat. The utilisation of a vote function is not only supported by the large amount of literature on vote and popularity functions, but in addition Mughan (1987; 198) makes clear that the primary purpose of vote functions should be forecasting -"predicting the outcome of an event before it occurs" -instead of explaining. For this reason, we have used Vermeir & Heyndels's (2006) vote function for Flemish municipalities to measure the probability of electoral defeat.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: section 2 is an overview of the relevant literature, section 3 formulates a number of observations on the present state of research in this field, and section 4 presents models which estimate the probability of electoral defeat and which empirically test the presence of the strategic use of debt. Finally, concluding comments are given in section 5.
The literature
The literature on strategic deficit and debt behaviour originates from the question regarding whether or not incumbent policymakers run higher budget deficits than they would if they were confident of re-election.
Literature on the strategic use of debt stems from the paper by Persson & Svensson (1989) (henceforth the PS model). The PS model argues that voters have heterogeneous preferences concerning the size of government. Some voters want the government to provide a significant number of public services and increase its involvement while others are in favour of less government interference. The PS model assumes that incumbents adapt to voters' preferences and act accordingly. For example, the model predicts rightist governments awaiting a regime change to run budget deficits up to a much higher level than when they feel secure about their political future. The idea here is to reduce the public spending potential of the following (leftist) government by creating more debt. Higher levels of debt result in higher interest charges and thus reduce the next government's scope for policymaking. The opposite reaction is expected when a leftist government anticipates a regime change. Leftist governments traditionally favour higher public spending and the PS model predicts that leftist governments will run a budget surplus if they know that they will be succeeded by a rightist government. This budget surplus expands the budget of the incoming rightist government and induces it to spend more than it otherwise would.
The theoretical work of Persson & Svensson (1989) was followed by the contribution of Alesina & Tabellini (1990) (henceforth the AT model), which is also theoretical in nature. This paper also emphasises strategic considerations in the formation of debt policy, but from a different viewpoint. While the PS model focuses on the level of spending, the AT model assumes that governments differ with respect to their preferences concerning the composition of government spending. Again, this is a reflection of voters' preferences. When a government expects to be replaced, it runs a budget deficit which will bring the nature of future public spending closer to its preferences. In fact, the deficit allows the current government to spend more on public services than it wishes by reducing future expenditures on public services from which it gets little in return. Consider, for example, a government which prefers spending on education to road construction and assume that it expects to be replaced by a government with the opposite preferences. The current government can expect that spending on education will be cut by the next government. Therefore, it can opt to run up a deficit and spend the extra resources on education as an advance on the spending cuts in education which will result from the next government's policies. Today's government thus ties the hands of future governments by allocating future tax revenues to debt servicing. The marginal cost of repaying the additional debt therefore impacts the preferences of the new government, about which the outgoing government cares little.
The AT model expects a deficit bias irrespective of the government's political ideology, which is to say that a strong likelihood of being voted out of office will generate an incentive to issue debt, regardless of the government's political preferences. The AT model thus yields a symmetrical prediction on the role played by the probability of electoral defeat. The PS model's prediction, on the other hand, is asymmetrical since it predicts that only right-wing governments will issue debt. So whereas in the AT model the probability to be voted out of office raises debt per se, this is only the case for potentially outgoing right-wing governments in the PS model.
The AT and PS model differ with respect to the assumptions made concerning the utility functions of the parties. They both assume that political polarisation and the likelihood of a regime switch are major determinants of preelectoral debt policy. Fiscal policy will thus be more volatile when governments expect to be replaced than when they expect to remain in place.
In the literature, various authors have expanded upon, criticised or empirically tested the PS and AT models. Lockwood et al. (1996) , for example, build on the PS model. They assume that two parties alternate in power and have different preferences with regard to the level of public services provision. Lockwood et al. (1996) innovate in assuming that incumbents do not care aboutor care very little about -policy outcomes when not in power, so parties in power are expected to be myopic near the end of their term of office. Incumbents have an incentive to fund their expenditures by issuing debt, knowing that they will not have to face the consequences of debt financing for some time, i.e. the so-called "quasi-finite horizon effect". According to Lockwood et al. (1996) , this implies that pre-electoral debt expansion dominates the strategic effects of the PS model such that in their models the strategic effects appear only to be of secondary importance. Incumbents only have an incentive to use debt strategically to affect their successors' tax and spending decisions to the extent that it influences the level of debt that the (current) incumbent party will inherit when it is next returned to power. For this reason, it is predominantly the "quasi-finite horizon effect" which rules.
The Martimort (2001) model contradicts the expectations of the PS model. The major contribution of the Martimort (2001) model is that it stresses the strategic role of budget deficits when parties differ only with respect to their redistributive concerns 2 . According to Martimort (2001) , political regime switching introduces fluctuations in the distribution of utility in the economy. These fluctuations justify strategic budget distortions by governments currently in office which are willing to favour their redistributive concerns over the policies of a future government. Contrary to the PS model, Martimort (2001; 573) expects "leftist governments to be more enclined to redistribute income. By running some deficit today, the leftist government ensures that society gets poorer tomorrow. A future rightist government will redistribute more as society gets poorer tomorrow. The implemented tax policy will thus be close to what a leftist government would have chosen itself. On the contrary, by running a surplus today, a rightist government relaxes the burden of taxation imposed by tomorrow's leftist government on high income agents. This leftist government will be less eager to redistribute and will adopt the rightist party's behaviour."
For empirical research on strategic debt models, we refer to the findings of Pettersson-Lidbom (2001), Lockwood et al. (1996) , Carmignani (2003) , Crain & Tollison (1993) , Grilli et al. (1991) , Lambertini (2003) and Franzese (2001) .
Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) and Lockwood et al. (1996) present evidence consistent with the PS model. Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) examines the accumulation of debt by Swedish local governments and finds significantly positive effects of the probability of electoral defeat on the accumulation of debt. Using a dataset consisting of 277 municipalities for the period from 1974 to 1994, Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) finds strong differences between right-and left-wing governments. As expected in the PS model, right-wing governments accumulate more debt (+15%) when facing a higher probability of defeat, whereas the opposite occurs for left-wing governments (-11%). Lockwood et al. (1996) not only build on the PS model theoretically but also test their hypotheses empirically. Using annual data for the United Kingdom on government debt (and taxes and expenditures) for the period from 1956 to 1996, their empirical findings are generally consistent with theoretical expectations (as described earlier). Carmignani (2003) and Crain & Tollison (1993) build on the AT model and find empirical support for it. For a sample of western European democracies, Carmignani (2003) shows that government instability -when it involves a replacement of decision-makers -increases the size of deficits. Crain & Tollison (1993) employ data from US states covering the period from 1968 to 1989 and report that as the likelihood of a government change increases, the volatility of fiscal measures -and specifically taxes and surplus/deficit levels -increases.
Other empirical studies by Grilli et al. (1991) , Lambertini (2003) and Franzese (2001) find no significant evidence for the strategic use of debt or deficits. Grilli et al. (1991) investigate the reasons for the existence of differences in the debt-to-GNP ratio in 18 OECD countries over the period from 1960 to1989, but find no evidence that supports the PS or AT models. Lambertini (2003) uses US (1960 US ( -1995 and pooled data for 16 OECD countries (1960 16 OECD countries ( -1992 to test both the PS model and the AT model. For the US dataset, opinion polls are used to measure the probability of being voted out of office, while for OECD countries a probit equation on the probability of government change is estimated. For the AT model, Lambertini (2003) tests whether government outlays on defence are higher under more conservative governments and whether government expenditures on social security and welfare are higher under more liberal governments. For the PS model, Lambertini (2003) investigates whether cyclically adjusted government budget surpluses are lower under conservative rather than liberal governments. Results show that there is no evidence which confirms the expected effects, irrespective of the model adopted (AT or PS). None of the datasets measured by Lambertini (2003) show that the probability of being voted out of office has a significant impact on government budget surpluses. Franzese (2001) examines the political determinants of debt and deficits for 21 OECD countries and, like Lambertini (2003) , rejects the predictions generated by strategic use of debt models. Franzese's (2001) bivariate analysis shows that his "risk replacement variable" does not correlate with debts or deficits. As Franzese (2001) points out himself, a bivariate analysis is actually not appropriate for exploring conditional hypotheses such as strategic use of debt theories. Greater importance, he argues, should be given to his multivariate analyses. His multivariate model, however, provides no support for strategic debt policy. The risk replacement variable is marginally significant and suggests that the probability of being voted out of office prompts governments to engage in debt policy manipulation. However, contrary to the PS model, leftist governments increase and rightist governments decrease deficits as the replacement risk increases.
To summarise, the empirical evidence in the literature shows no consensus on whether or not an incumbent's probability of being voted out of office provides an explanation for pre-electoral debt policy.
Discussion
Although different models provide theoretical explanations for budget deficit or debt changes, the empirical evidence is relatively weak. This does not necessarily mean that the strategic models can be refuted, yet certain observations can nevertheless be made.
First, the empirical disagreement indicates that fiscal decisions are the outcome of a more complicated political process. Variables other than the probability of being voted out of office also seem to matter for fiscal policy. Lambertini (2003) suggests that macroeconomic and other exogenous events which are not accounted for in the PS or AT models also explain budget deficits or surpluses. To reduce the impact of these exogenous events, it might be advisable to look for evidence of strategic use of debt behaviour within singlecountry data such that the impact of these types of events is constant over all observations. Consequently, it is not coincidental that Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) finds evidence of strategic use of debt when analysing data from Swedish municipalities.
Second, we could question whether evidence for the strategic use of debt models can be found outside two-party systems or similar situations. The AT model is based on a two-party environment while the PS model explains the behaviour of "a" rightist government expecting to be replaced by "a" leftist government or vice versa, but gives no consideration as to the precise composition of each government. The empirical tests which support the strategic use of debt models have all been performed on governments operating within a two-party system.
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But what if more than two parties are running for government? On the one hand, the strategic use of fiscal policy could become less attractive the larger the coalition becomes. This is because increasing debt might reduce the future policy options of one or more of the coalition partners who might return to office as members of a new coalition. This is not unlikely in coalition governments since the probability that at least one of the members will stay in office increases as the number of coalition partners grows. Grilli et al. (1991) also point out that changes in coalition governments are rarely due to a total breakdown of the underlying coalition. On the other hand, Ashworth et al. (2006) state that parties in a coalition are on average less certain of future power than parties not sharing power. Indeed, coalition parties not only have to "win" the elections but they also have to survive the ensuing coalition negotiations. Hence, their shorter time horizon may lead coalition governments to be more sensitive to the strategic use of debt. Consequently, fragmented governments are expected to more strongly (and consciously) engage in debt creation in election years. The role of fragmentation in strategic debt models should thus be clarified.
Third, the theoretical PS model assumes that incumbents know that they will be replaced. What about a situation where electoral uncertainty leads to uncertainty regarding the nature of the next government? Although Persson & Svensson (1989; 342) conjecture that uncertainty about whether or not a current government remains in power would not fundamentally change their findings, Alesina & Tabellini (1990) introduce uncertainty in their theoretical model. In fact, empirical models also differ from the PS model and introduce a variable which measures the probability of electoral defeat so as to take account of uncertainty. Reviewing the literature, we find as many approaches to calculating that probability as there are empirical studies on the strategic use of debt. In addition to differences in model specification -such as time period, sample or differences in the definition of what is seen as deficit or debt -we suggest that the definition of the crucial variable concerning re-election prospects may explain the inconsistency of empirical findings. We do not dispute that what moves governments to act strategically (or not) before elections is their assessment of upcoming electoral outcomes, but rather we only address disagreement in the construction or measurement of that crucial variable.
Empirical analysis
The setting for our empirical analysis follows on from the considerations above. First, we empirically test the existence of strategic debt models against singlecountry data. Our dataset consists of 294 Flemish municipalities covering four election periods (1982, 1988, 1994 and 2000) . Although there are 308 Flemish municipalities in total, data unavailability precludes the use of more than the 294 in question. Second, in Flemish municipalities multiple parties with various ideological characteristics compete for office in a system of proportional representation. For this reason, our analysis takes into account ideological differences as well as potential fragmentation effects. Finally, we take into account uncertainty about future government participation. 4 Our crucial variable to proxy the probability of electoral defeat is not constructed ad hoc, but rather is derived from the literature on vote functions.
In this section, we first discuss a number of characteristics of Flemish local governments. Second, we introduce a vote function to proxy the probability of electoral defeat and, lastly, we test the presence of strategic use of debt in Flemish municipalities.
Flemish municipalities
Through a series of institutional reforms over the past three decades, Belgium has become a federal state. The power to make decisions is no longer the exclusive preserve of the federal government and various entities, which independently exercise their authority within their domains, govern Belgium. Among these entities are the three communities which relate to language and culture, i.e. the Flemish Community, the French Community and the German-speaking Community. Belgium also has three regions which relate to economic interests : the Flemish Region, the Brussels Capital Region and the Walloon Region. Finally, municipalities, which are under the tutelage of the regions, constitute the lowest level of government. Municipalities have wide-ranging autonomy and their councils are authorised to pursue any policy which promotes the interests of their inhabitants. They are therefore competent to take any initiative not explicitly prohibited by central legislation. Municipalities also enjoy far-reaching budgetary autonomy, i.e. the ability to independently decide on the level and structure of revenues and expenditures (Vanneste, 2002) . Flemish municipalities' most important expenditure items are public administration, public safety, education and social services, while their most important sources of revenue are taxation and grants from higher levels of government (which are, for the most part, 4 In Flemish municipalities governed by a coalition, it is not uncommon for different parties to meet and discuss the formation of the next government even before elections have taken place. Indeed, Ackaert (2006) shows that in the run-up to the elections of October 2000, discussions about future coalitions had taken place during the summer in 67.4% of municipalities. One could thus argue that in 67.4% of Flemish municipalities incumbents are certain of the participation of their party in the next government. We doubt this reasoning. First, Ackaert (2006) shows that in 43.6% of these municipalities preparatory talks broke down before the elections. Second, the findings are based on a questionnaire sent out during the summer of 2000, while (strategic) tax policy decisions have to be made before the end of the year preceding the elections. The incidence of preparatory talks which take place about one year before elections will thus be less frequent than reported. Third, Ackaert (2006) does not indicate which parties took part in these preparatory talks, so it may be that only some or even none of the current governing parties were involved. Finally, preparatory talks or agreements do not guarantee actual government participation once the elections have taken places. unconditional). In addition, Flemish municipalities may finance expenditures through debt-financing. Although they can arrange public loans, they still borrow almost exclusively from private banks. There is no formal permission required for a municipality to borrow funds. Four-fifths of local debt is contracted over the long term to finance investments. Long-term debt, which is the focus of this paper, was on average EUR 1045 per capita in 2000. Proportionally, local public debt is about 5% of total public debt (in terms of government debt under the Maastricht Treaty) while in relation to GNP it is slightly below 5%. In general, the EMU convergence process induced by the Maastricht Treaty mainly involves the federal government. The municipalities' expected budget track is a small net financing surplus, and the balance of accounts for the local public sector does indeed show a small net financing capacity of about 0.2% of GNP.
Flemish local governments have a parliamentary system consisting of the local council (the legislative body) and the College of the Mayor and Aldermen (the executive body). Seats on the council are allocated using a system of proportional representation while the composition of the College is determined by the party (or parties) holding a majority position on the council. Elections are held every 6 years and incumbents can be indefinitely re-elected (there are no binding term limits).
Expectation of electoral defeat
The strategic debt models assume that governments which expect to be replaced will modify the debt position before elections. A crucial element in these models is the introduction of an equation to measure the probability of electoral defeat. Pettersson-Lidbom (2001), Carmignani (2003) and Lambertini (2003) each create a different auxiliary equation which links the unobserved variable, that is, the expectation of electoral defeat, to a set of observable variables which might be expected to affect the probability of electoral defeat. The Pettersson-Lidbom (2001) set of explanatory variables is restricted to historical voting patterns and the frequency of previous government changes. Franzese (2001) , Grilli et al. (1991) and Crain & Tollison (1993) also use historical stability variables. Franzese (2001) launches a "replacement risk variable", which is simply the inverse of the actual duration in years of the incumbent's mandate, i.e. the risk rate of losing office in a year. Grilli et al. (1991) use the frequency of government changes in the past, while Crain & Tollison (1993) measure the probability of no regime change from historical seats shares. Carmignani (2003) estimates the probability of government termination through a probit analysis with different variables. Besides the stability of the government during the previous year, political fragmentation, political polarisation and GDP growth for the current and previous year are introduced into the equation. Lambertini (2003) introduces two constructs to estimate a government's prospects. She first estimates a political affiliation index for the government calculated using election dates, change-ofgovernment dates, the direction of the change in government and the ideological position of the government. A change in the value of the index is thus a change in the government in the Lambertini (2003) model. Second, in her analysis on US data she introduces opinion polls as a proxy for the probability of electoral defeat.
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Different authors use different methods to estimate the probability of electoral defeat. The question of what a good proxy might be remains open. We are fully conscious that the real expected probability of re-election or electoral defeat is hard to measure. The literature has so far focused on historical political stability determinants only, but other, additional determinants, such as economic, tax and political variables, may explain whether incumbents are re-elected or not. Ultimately, when judging the probability of electoral defeat, incumbents need to assess voters' likely behaviour in the voting booth. It thus becomes important for incumbents to evaluate the relevant determinants that voters have in mind when voting for or against the current government. The determinants of voting behaviour have been studied intensively in the literature on vote functions (see e.g. Paldam & Schneider, 1980; Nannestad & Paldam, 1994; Lewis-Beck & Paldam, 2000; Revelli, 2002; Vermeir & Heyndels, 2006; Geys & Vermeir, 2008) . In general, these functions explain the vote (or a change in the vote) for a given government during elections through (a change in) political, economic and tax variables (Nannestad & Paldam, 1994) . Although some of the political variables are historical stability variables, vote functions are not restricted to them.
The novelty of this paper is that we introduce a vote function to measure the expectation of the probability of electoral defeat. Mughan (1987; 198) makes clear that the primary purpose of vote functions should be forecasting -"predicting the outcome of an event before it occurs"-instead of explaining. Norpoth & Gschwend (2003) also show that a model based on insights from electoral research could be a good instrument to predict the level of votes cast for incumbents. In this paper, we use the insights of vote function models to estimate the probability of electoral defeat for incumbents. If they expect not to remain in power, incumbents may decide to act strategically.
In our analysis, we estimate the prospects of electoral defeat using the Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) vote function for Flemish municipalities. To test whether yardstick voting is present in Flemish municipalities, Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) empirically analyse the votes at municipal elections. They find that incumbents are punished for higher tax rates and that the electoral punishment depends on the tax rates in neighbouring municipalities. In addition to the tax variables, the Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) analysis also covers political and economic variables and as such their model is a good starting point given the purpose of this paper.
Still, our aim is not to explain votes, but rather estimate incumbents' assessment of their electoral prospects. Next, we introduce these prospects in the explanation of debt policy changes in election years. As such, we first reconstruct Vermeir & Heyndels's (2006) vote function. Second, we apply this function to the pre-electoral year's values for its explanatory variables to calculate the government's vote expectations. This adjustment is necessary because Flemish local governments must endorse budgets before 31 December of the previous year. Therefore, if incumbents wish to act strategically during the election year, changes in the level of debt must be agreed upon during the year preceding the elections. The decision whether or not to change local debt strategically in election year t thus has to be made in year t-1. In other words, this means that incumbents have to assess their electoral prospects one year before elections. Given both the role of each of the explanatory variables in the vote percentage and their values in pre-election year t-1, we can generate the expected number of votes for the government at the time the budget is drawn up. I. V it = α 1 + α 2 V it-6 + α 3 TAX it + α 4 NTAX it + α 5 EXP it + α 6 NEXP it + α 7 NTI it + α 8 UNEMPL it + α 9 NPAR it + year dummies + party dummies + u it where i = 1,..., N; t = election years V it represents the vote percentage in favour of the government party (parties) of municipality i in election year t. The first explanatory variable is the vote percentage of the same government party (parties) in the previous elections (V it-6 ). The coefficient of V it-6 is expected to have a positive impact on the number of votes.
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TAX it is a vector of tax instruments and includes the local income tax rate (LITR it ) and the local property tax rate (LPTR it ). We expect tax rates to have a negative impact on the vote percentage. Per capita public expenditure (EXP it ) is included to account for the quantity (and/or quality) of public output. This is expected to generate a positive impact on votes. We refer to the theory of yardstick voting -which suggests that voters compare their own municipality to their neighbouring municipalities when deciding on their vote (Besley & Case, 1995 and Revelli, 2002) -to include tax variables for neighbouring municipalities (NTAX it ). We introduce the average local tax rates of the neighbouring municipalities (LITRN it and LPTRN it ) 8 . The average per capita expenditures (NEXP it ) of the neighbouring municipalities are also introduced. Average local tax rates of neighbouring municipalities are expected to positively affect votes, while negative values are anticipated for the average per-capita expenditures of the neighbouring municipalities. As the literature on economic voting suggests that governments are held accountable for economic developments, net taxable income (NTI it ) and the unemployment rate (UNEMPL it ) are introduced. Income is expected to have a positive effect on votes, while the opposite applies for unemployment. Political characteristics enter vote function I through the number of government parties (NPAR it ), which accounts for clarity of accountability. More coalition partners are expected to reduce transparency, so fragmented governments are held less accountable for positive or negative developments (Powell & Whitten, 1993) . As governments are more often punished for negative developments than they are rewarded for positive developments, Nicholson et al. (2002) show that fragmented governments generally suffer smaller electoral losses. The number of government parties is thus expected to have a positive effect on the vote. The possibility of vote swings among government parties is another possible explanation for a positive coefficient since it is less clear which party voters might hold accountable for policy. Year dummies are introduced to 7 Two remarks concerning this variable: first, this variable is not strictly a lagged dependent variable. This could be a lagged dependent variable, but only if the previous government stayed in office. Second, the definition of this variable implies that the dataset does not contain data from all Flemish municipalities. Sometimes it is impossible to calculate previous election results for the government. Parties may split up, merge with another party, change their names, disappear, or a member of the government can change parties. The dataset -which corresponds with that of Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) -only contains observations from which previous election results can be indisputably calculated. We are thus confronted with an unbalanced panel as we do not have observations for every election in every municipality. Finally, our dataset contains 688 observations for 294 (out of 308) municipalities. Finally, party year dummies are introduced, as Heath et al. (1999) , Jérôme & Lewis-Beck (1999) and Revelli (2002) show that local election results reflect national party popularity rather than the appreciation of local developments and policies. The impact of national or regional politics on local elections is captured by the inclusion of party dummies for the five national parties that participated in municipal governments, and this for each election year. 10 We intend to use the Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) vote function as an instrument to estimate the probability of electoral defeat. Therefore, we first reconstruct the results of Vermeir & Heyndels's (2006) vote function as accurately as possible. They tested different approaches, including pooled OLS regressions, OLS regressions including fixed municipality effects, 2SLS regressions with and without municipality fixed effects, and concluded that their preference goes to the 2SLS regression without municipality effects (Vermeir & Heyndels, 2006; 2295) . We therefore estimate equation I. to be technically analogous to Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) and use a 2SLS approach -without municipality effects -in which internal and neighbouring tax variables are instrumented.
11 Frey & Schneider (1978) and Schneider & Pommerehne (1980) show that tax variables in the UK and Australia, respectively, may not be assumed to be exogenous, as the level of popularity affects tax policy. We may thus expect the error term to be correlated with the tax rates. Neighbouring tax variables are instrumented because the presence of spatial correlation in the error is suggested by Revelli (2002) and Solé Ollé (2003) in their models on tax mimicking. We follow Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) by instrumenting own tax rates and per-capita expenditures using the percentage of young people and the elderly, the average sale price of small and medium-sized homes and the number of inhabitants. Tax rates and per capita expenditures of neighbouring municipalities are similarly instrumented. The Sargan tests on the validity of the instruments indicate that the instruments are valid. Table 1 presents the results of the estimation while the descriptive statistics for the explanatory variables are shown in Table A1 in the appendix. 9 Year effects are introduced to measure the electoral change common to all governments in a given year. 10 We introduced dummies for the liberal democratic VLD, for the social democratic SP.a, for the Christian democratic CD&V, for the ecologist GROEN! and for the nationalist VU. The extremeright Vlaams Blok (Vlaams Belang) does not participate in any municipal government. 11 These "neighbouring tax variables" are the local income tax rate, the local property tax rate and per-capita expenditures. In this table, column (1) provides the most general results while in column (2) only the statistically significant variables are maintained and as such provide the most efficient estimation. We focus on the latter. The prior vote (V it-6 ), the municipality's own local income tax rate (LITR it ), the average local income tax rate in the neighbouring municipalities (LITRN it ), the average per capita expenditure in the neighbouring municipalities (NEXP it ), the net taxable income (NTI it ) and the number of parties (NPAR it ) have a significant impact on the vote percentage of government parties. All significant variables have the expected signs and the coefficients are highly comparable to Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) . 13 It is clear from Table 1 that local tax policy has an impact on election results. The regression results show that a government's local income tax rate negatively influences the vote percentage. High local income tax rates are thus electorally costly, while there is no evidence that local property tax rates have an impact on votes for a government. The average local income tax rate of the neighbouring municipalities affects the vote percentage positively, so voters use the tax policies of surrounding municipalities as a yardstick. Per-capita expenditures in neighbouring municipalities have a negative effect on the vote percentage while there is no significant impact attributed to the expenditure level in the municipality itself. Political variables are also important when explaining the vote percentage. The number of government parties presents a positive coefficient, confirming that fragmented governments lose fewer votes. With regard to the party-year effects, we only find the dummy for the liberal party in 2000 to present a significant coefficient. 14 Finally, there is evidence that voters hold local governments responsible for macroeconomic policy since NTI it has a significant negative sign. Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) refer to the "clientele hypothesis" by Rattinger (1981 Rattinger ( & 1991 as this may explain that "at lower levels of [...] income, voters tend to stay with or go back to traditional government parties" (Vermeir & Heyndels, 2006; 2292) . The lack of a significant impact of UNEMPL it suggests that voters do not hold local governments responsible for employment policy. For this, it is true that "most policy instruments to fight unemployment are in the hands of the federal and regional government" (Vermeir & Heyndels, 2006; 2292) . The next step is to generate the forecasted values of the vote percentage. For each observation, we determine the forecasted value of the vote percentage based on the vote function estimated in Table 1 using one year lagged values for the explanatory variables. 13 In comparison with Vermeir & Heyndels' (2006) 2SLS results as presented in column (4) of (their) Table 5 (on p. 2294). 14 The coefficient of this dummy is 3.761 (t = 2.92, p<0.01), providing evidence that the Liberal party benefits at the local level from its electoral success at the federal and regional levels. At both government levels, The Liberal party won the 1999 elections, re-entered the governing coalitions and provided the Prime Ministers. Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) do not report on the party-year effects.
In Table A2 in appendix, we present statistics on both the forecasted values resulting from the preceding analysis (V f it ) 15 and the outcome of elections (V it ). Mean, median and maximum values are highly comparable. The histograms show that the frequency distribution of both series is also comparable. The correlation between the two values is 0.62. Whether or not these forecasted values explain strategic debt policy is evaluated in the following section.
Strategic use of debt
In this section we test for the strategic use of debt in Flemish municipalities. In general, we look for evidence indicating whether or not the change in debt position during election years is governed by the government's expectations in terms of votes. The theory of the strategic use of debt predicts that governments which are not expecting to be re-elected in the next election will make a change in the debt position. If this is the case, a change in debt position in election years should be a function of the governments' re-election prospects. To empirically test this hypothesis, we run regression II., which explains debt policy changes in election years:
II. ΔDEBT it =  1 +  2 PED it + X it + u it ; where i = 1,..., N; t = election years 1988, 1994, 2000 The dependent variable ΔDEBT it measures the year-to-year change in debt per capita in election years and is explained by the probability of electoral defeat (PED it ) and a number of control variables (X it ).
We derive the government's re-election prospects from the estimation of the vote percentage (V f it ) obtained from the previous sections, but transform V f it to a dummy variable (PED x it ) which takes value 1 if the government does not expect to be returned to office and 0 if it expects to have its mandate renewed. Theoretically, this dummy variable is attributed value 1 if the forecasted vote percentage (V f it ) is below majority (V f it <50%) and 0 otherwise. As stated by Norpoth & Gschwend (2003) , governing coalitions whose parties obtain a majority in an election can expect to remain in office, while those who fail in that objective can expect to be replaced by a new government. This supposes a generalisation to all governments with vote expectations below 50%, for which we expect a strategic change in debt position. Perhaps this assumption is too strict since, despite vote expectations below 50%, their behaviour may be mutually divergent. In particular, governments with low vote expectations are expected to 15 To indicate that we use forecasted values, we have added an "f" to V it . engage in strategic debt policy. Conversely, governments with vote expectations just below 50% may believe that they will be able to attract the additional votes necessary to return to office and will not change debt strategically. The question then becomes at what level of vote expectations do governments which do not expect to be re-elected change debt strategically? To deal with this, we introduce a multitude of PED x it dummies which cover governments with vote expectations below x percent. In fact, we test the theoretical construct, i.e. whether governments with vote expectations below 50% (PED 50 it ) change debt levels strategically, but also whether governments with vote expectations below 49% (PED 49 it ), below 48% (PED 48 it ), etc. strategically change their level of debt.
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This enables us to test if the strategic debt effect is present in general for expectations below 50%, or if it kicks in at a lower level of vote expectations.
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Like Pettersson-Lidbom (2001), we try to distinguish between the PS and AT models. According to the AT model, we may expect a government with expectations of defeat to issue debt irrespective of its political ideology. Conversely, the PS model predicts that only rightist governments issue debt when they expect to be replaced, while leftist governments are expected to do the opposite. The introduction of an interaction variable with product terms PED x it on the one hand and dummy variable LEFTMAJ it on the other hand makes it possible to distinguish between the two models. LEFTMAJ it equals 1 if leftist parties have at least 50% of the seats in the College and 0 otherwise.
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To test both seminal models we extend equation II. to:
x it +  3 LEFTMAJ it * PED x it +  4 LEFTMAJ it + X it + u it ; where i = 1,..., N; t = election years
To determine whether our analysis presents evidence of the strategic use of debt, we must focus on  2 and  3 in estimation III. Whether strategic debt behaviour is in line with the AT or the PS expectations depends on the simultaneous interpretation of both coefficients. If  2 is significantly positive 16 These dummy variables PED 17 We gratefully thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 18 For the definition of our dummy variable LEFTMAJ it we took into account the number of seats held by the Socialists and the Ecologists. Deschouwer (1996 ) & Rihoux (2001 position the Christian Democrats, the Nationalists and local parties at the centre. The Ecologists and the Socialists are at the left of the centre, while the Liberals are at the right of the centre. Thus in our analysis we distinguish between leftist parties (LEFTMAJ it =1) and parties at the centre or at right of centre (LEFTMAJ it =0). This approach is in line with Pettersson-Lidbom (2001). while  3 remains insignificant, there is support for the AT model as governmentsirrespective of their political ideologies -expecting an electoral defeat increase debt. Should the following three conditions be fulfilled, i.e.  2 is significantly positive,  3 is significantly negative and ( 2 +  3 ) is negative, then there is evidence for the PS model in which leftist governments anticipating an electoral defeat decrease debt, while other governments with the same prospects increase debt.
Variable X it in equation III. represents variables affecting debt policy. Although we expect strategic motivations to account for the change in debt level, other determinants may also explain this change.
First, we take into account the level of debt in pre-election years (DEBT it-1 ). This variable can have opposing effects on the level of debt changes. On the one hand, we may assume that governments with low debts have more "margin" to increase debt than governments with higher debt levels. Highly indebted governments are expected to be more unlikely to increase debt as this would worsen their financial position all the more. An additional increase in debt raisesceteris paribus -the cost of debt, which may lead to an additional need for debt financing. Still, this expected unresponsiveness may be unrealistic as high levels of debt may become self-reinforcing. This is commonly referred to as the "snowball effect" and should result in a positive sign. The sign of DEBT it-1 thus is a priori unknown.
The change in inhabitants' net taxable income (ΔNTI it ), measured as the year-to-year change in the net taxable income per capita, can have two (opposing) effects on the evolution of debt levels (Ashworth et al., 2005) . On the one hand, ΔNTI it is an indication of the change in the fiscal capacity of the municipality since the majority of local revenue comes from local income tax. An increase in net taxable income may reduce the need for loan financing, so a negative sign can be expected. On the other hand, ΔNTI it may indicate changes in demand for public services and may increase the need for debt financing, which may lead to a positive sign (Geys, 2007) . Taking both effects together, the sign of ΔNTI it is a priori uncertain.
Besides changes in taxable income, changes in demographic and socioeconomic variables may also lead to changes in the demand for public expenditures and have an effect on debt evolution (Ashworth et al., 2005 & Geys, 2007 . To account for this, we introduce the changes in the proportion of young inhabitants (ΔYOUNG it ), changes in the proportion of elderly inhabitants (ΔOLD it ), changes in the unemployment rate (ΔUNEMPL it ) and changes in the number of inhabitants (ΔPOP it ) in estimation III. These variables are the year-onyear change in the percentage of inhabitants which are, respectively, below 20, over 64, unemployed and the year-on-year change in the number of inhabitants. Each time positive coefficients are expected due to higher levels of young individuals, elderly and unemployed persons could represent a higher demand for specific capital-intensive expenditures such as schools, care for the elderly or social housing, leading to higher levels of public debt (Bahl & Duncombe, 1993) . Moreover, an increase in the number of inhabitants represents the need for additional public services and infrastructure in general.
A change in debt position may also be a response to the financial costs of borrowing (Ashworth et al., 2005 & Geys, 2007 , the idea being that rising borrowing costs restrain rational governments from increasing debt financing. Besides the level of debt, borrowing costs depend on the real interest rate on longterm (federal) government bonds. We introduce this rate's year-to-year change (ΔINTEREST it ) to measure changes in the cost of borrowing. A negative sign is expected.
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Political variables have also received attention as determinants of debt policy in the past (see e.g. Alesina & Perotti, 1995; Gärtner, 2000; Ashworth et al., 2005) . In our regression, ideological differences are taken into account by the introduction of dummy LEFTMAJ it . We expect a positive value here, as in public finance literature it is widely accepted (see Hibbs, 1977 ) that leftist governments have higher spending, which we may assume is at least partly financed by debt. Leftist governments are thus expected to increase debt more easily. Higher spending may also be expected for fragmented governments. The Weak Government Hypothesis (Roubini & Sachs, 1989a,b) attributes higher public spending to more fragmented (or divided) governments because several conflicting political objectives have to be accommodated. Fragmentation may therefore more easily lead to an increase in debt. We introduce the number of government parties (NPAR it ) to measure the effect of fragmentation. However, this factor's effect on ΔDEBT it may not be linear. We refer to Ashworth et al. (2005 Ashworth et al. ( & 2006 , Geys (2007) and Goeminne et al. (2008) who have previously found a non-linear effect of government fragmentation on Flemish local governments' fiscal decision-making. As a matter of fact, Geys (2007; 246) finds that "in election years […] the growth rate of local public debt is lower for oneparty governments compared to large coalitions". Consequently, we then test a non linear specification, adding squared terms NPAR² it . Finally, we introduce yeardummies to capture year effects.
Replacing X it in equation III. with these control variables, we estimate the following equation IV. :
IV. ΔDEBT it =  1 +  2 PED it +  3 LEFTMAJ it * PED it +  4 LEFTMAJ it +  5 DEBT it-1 +  6 ΔNTI it +  7 ΔYOUNG it +  8 ΔOLD it +  9 ΔUNEMPL it +  10 ΔPOP it +  11 ΔINTEREST it +  12 NPAR it +  13 NPAR² it + year dummies t + u it ; where i = 1,..., N; t = election years Table 2 presents the results of the OLS estimations for per-capita debt change in election years given different levels of vote expectations. Linear regressions on panel data with random effects are implemented and cover data from 294 of the 308 Flemish municipalities.
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Since our number of years is small and the number of cross-sectional units is rather large, random effects model estimators are more efficient than fixed effects model estimators (Gujarati, 2003) . Moreover, introducing a fixed effects model would be expensive in terms of degrees of freedom since we have only three time series of data. The Hausman tests we present also suggest that it is safe to use random effects. Before estimating our model, we tested for the existence of multicollinearity in our dataset and therefore ran a correlation analysis. The correlation matrix indicated that the pairwise correlation coefficient of ΔYOUNG it and the year dummy for 2000 (r=-0.97) exceeds the suggested threshold of |r|>0.80 (see Gujarati, 2003) . We therefore shifted the year dummy from the analysis.
In table 2 we do not run regressions for governments with vote expectations below 40% since the Hausman test suggests that random effects are no longer appropriate below this level.
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For comparability reasons, we only present random effects results. To provide a general view of the results in a single table, we only present estimation results for the most efficient regressions (leaving out insignificant variables). 22 20 We continue on the dataset used to estimate the vote function. For remarks on the composition of the dataset, we refer to footnote 7. In addition, we lose one more observation since we do not have data on the level of per-capita debt in 1993 for the municipality Aarschot. 21 Table A4 in appendix presents the number of observations for each PED Before focusing on the strategic debt hypotheses, we have a quick look at the control variables. We find significant positive coefficients for ΔYOUNG it , ΔOLD it and ΔINTEREST it . For ΔYOUNG it and ΔOLD it , this sign is in line with expectations, i.e. if the percentage of young and elderly in the entire population changes, debt changes in the same manner. A negative coefficient was anticipated for ΔINTEREST it . While we expect governments to refrain from increasing debt financing as the cost of borrowing increases, the results show that an increase in borrowing cost results in an increase in debt. Obviously, governments do not succeed in reducing debt when costs increase, but on the contrary they seem to take on additional debt to finance the increased cost of borrowing. This is in line with the so-called "snowball effect" and demonstrates the negative side effects which high interest rates may have on indebtedness. This effect is also found by Ashworth et al. (2005) and Geys (2007) . Except when tested for governments expecting less than 50% of the vote (see column 1), DEBT it-1 presents a significant positive coefficient (in columns 2 to 10), which indicates a positive effect of the debt levels in the year before elections on debt changes in election years. This positive sign may be another indicator of the "snowball effect", suggesting that high levels of debt become self-reinforcing. There is no indication that a change in income and unemployment or in the government's size evolution and fragmentation affects debt changes in election years, nor does LEFTMAJ it present a significant coefficient. Finally, the dummy variable for the year 1994 does present a significant coefficient and the negative value of this coefficient suggests that debt increases were weaker for that year.
Focusing on the strategic debt hypotheses, it is clear from column (1) in Table 2 that PED 50 it was indeed chosen arbitrarily. The use of dummies for lower vote expectations in columns (2) to (10) shows that governments with vote expectations below 49% change debt differently from governments with higher vote expectations. Nevertheless, this effect cannot be generalised to the PS or AT model. However, for all tested operationalisations below 49%, neither the PED x it nor the LEFTMAJ it variables are significant. Their interaction terms consequently present significant coefficients and thus strongly suggest that left-wing governments with bad re-election prospects have different slope coefficients. Moreover, the sign of the interaction term is negative, providing evidence that leftist governments with vote expectations below the appropriate percentages have a negative impact on changes in debt levels in election years. This behaviour is in line with the PS model, but only for leftist governments not expecting to be returned to office. Although it is not linear, the overall trend is that the lower the expected votes, the larger the impact on debt changes (from EUR 59.75 per capita for PED 49 it to EUR 107.18 per capita for PED 41 it ) or, put otherwise, the stronger the strategic reaction.
If strategic debt policy in line with the PS model is only observed for leftist majority governments, then what could be an explanation for the absence of strategic debt behaviour by other governments? We suggest that this could be explained by the consequences of strategic debt behaviour on the government's favourites policies if, contrary to expectations, the government is returned to office.
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If -as shown in Table 2 -a leftist government with poor re-election prospects reduces debt levels before elections but then unexpectedly remains in office, this debt reduction does not prevent the leftist government from continuing with its favourite policies during the next term. Indeed, debt reduction before elections creates a financial margin for increasing expenditures upon return to office. On the contrary, when a rightist government with bad re-election prospects increases debt before elections -as the PS model predicts -it will be confronted with the negative consequences of its behaviour on its favourite policies if it surprisingly regains a majority. Specifically, an increase in debt levels not only increases future expenditures through capital reimbursements and interest payments, but it also adversely affects the financial margin available for the tax reductions traditionally favoured by a rightist government. For this reason, leftist governments are more generally expected to change debt strategically.
Conclusion
This paper discusses the literature on strategic use of debt models and empirically tests the seminal models of Persson & Svensson (1989) and Alesina & Tabellini (1990) on a dataset of Flemish municipalities. In general, the literature on strategic debt models shows that the evidence is mixed and we suggest that the lack of an undisputed measure to estimate the probability of electoral defeat obstructs the formulation of a general consensus on this matter. Most of these measures are based on historical political stability information which ignores the fact that incumbents have to try and guess what voters have in mind in the voting booth when estimating their government's probability of electoral defeat. As Baleiras (1997; 202) explicitly states "this probability depends on the electorate's assessment of the incumbent's performance while in office". They thus consider not only historical, but also tax, economic and political variables. The novelty of this paper is that we introduce vote functions to estimate the prospects of electoral defeat. For the purposes of this paper, the vote function of Vermeir & Heyndels (2006) is used to construct a good proxy for the prospects of electoral defeat. Our main results show that the strategic use of debt in Flemish municipalities can be observed for governments with expected vote percentages below 49%. Moreover, strategic debt changes can only be stated for leftist governments without reelection prospects, while the seminal models also formulate expectations about governments with opposing ideological characteristics. It thus seems that in Flemish municipalities, leftist majority governments without re-election prospects are sensitive to strategic debt behaviour, while this is not the case for their ideological counterparts. The repercussions of debt changes on the policies of a government which is unexpectedly returned to office are a likely explanation for these findings. 
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